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THAT BECAME THE ISRAELI DREAM
Ehud Ofer*
INTRODUCTION
This Note will examine the securities activities of banks in Israel.
The relatively new legislation dealing with this aspect-Regulation of
Investment Advice and Investment Portfolio Management Law (the
"Law")-was enacted in 1995 as a lesson learned from the Share
Regulation Affair of October 1983 (the "Share Regulation Affair" or the
"Crisis of 1983"). In many ways in economic history, 1983 was for
Israel what 1929 was for the United States. This Note will compare
Israel's episode with the U.S. episode and will use the comparison to
review the adequacy of the Israeli legislative response to the Crisis of
1983. The Law was enacted, primarily, based on American experience
and legislation. This Note will compare the legislation enacted in both
countries. To better understand the differences, this Note will introduce
the unique financial market in Israel. Furthermore, this Note will
present the recent legislative development in the United States (i.e.,
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) which repealed parts of the Depression-era
Glass-Steagall Act. The Note will examine the necessity of Israeli
"adjustments" to the Law due to this new development.
* Ehud Ofer is a graduate of the LL.M. program in Banking, Corporate and Finance
Law at Fordham University School of Law. This Note was written as his Thesis for his
LL.M. degree. The author would like to thank Sara Ofer and Hagit Hasson-Ofer for
their invaluable research assistance.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: FROM GLASS-STEAGALL
TO GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY
A. The Glass-Steajzall Act
1. Brief History
In 1933, the United States economy had collapsed in all major
aspects.' The unemployment rate among the formerly employed was at
25%, and "[o]ver 11,000 banks had failed or had to merge, reducing the
number by forty percent, from 25,000 to 14,000.' '2 Several state banks
were closed by the respective state Governors, and in March of that year,
President Roosevelt declared a national banking holiday.3 As did much
of the public, Congress placed the blame for the Great Depression
squarely on the nation's commercial banks.4 The enactment of the
Banking Act of 1933' was President Roosevelt's response to the
breakdown of the nation's financial and economic system.6 The
Banking Act of 1933 "reflected a determination that policies of
competition, convenience or expertise which might otherwise support
the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking business
were outweighed by the 'hazards' and 'financial dangers' that arise
when commercial banks engage in the activities proscribed by the
[Banking Act of 1933]."' Prohibiting banks from engaging in securities
activities was thought to prevent the reoccurrence of future banking
crises and financial calamities
1. GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKING 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Sen. R. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1933).
5. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
6. See BENSTON, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Inv. Co. Instit. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971) (stating remarks of Sen.
Bulkley).
8. Carlos D. Ramirez, Will the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Change the Future of
Corporate Finance?, 4 NAT'L LEGAL CTR. FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST 8, 12 (2000).
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The primary force behind the Banking Act was Senator Carter
Glass, 9 a former Treasury Secretary who is considered the "father" of
the Federal Reserve System.'0 For several years prior to 1933 he had
wanted to "restrict or forbid commercial banks from dealing in and
holding corporate securities."" It was the "'fixed purpose of Congress'
not to see the facilities of commercial banking diverted into speculative
operations by the aggressive and promotional character of the
investment banking business." 12 However, Glass was not able to
accomplish his goal "until disclosures concerning National City Bank,
the predecessor to Citibank, were brought out in the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency's Stock Exchange Practices Hearings."' 3
Despite having little interest in separating banking from Wall
Street, Congressman Henry Steagall, Chairman of the House Banking
and Currency Committee, signed on to the bill-eventually the Banking
Act of 1933-after Glass agreed to add Steagall's amendment to the bill
which authorized bank deposit insurance for the first time. 14
2. General Provisions of Glass-Steagall
"The 'Glass-Steagall' Act ("Glass-Steagall") has come to mean
only those sections of the Banking Act of 1933 that refer to banks'
securities operations-sections 16, 20, 21 and 32.""5 These four sections
of Glass-Steagall control commercial banks' domestic securities
operations. Sections 16 and 21 relate to the direct operations of
commercial banks, 16 while sections 20 and 32 refer to commercial bank
affiliations. 7
9. See Laura J. Cox, The Impact of the Citicorp-Travelers Group Merger on
Financial Modernization and the Repeal of Glass-Steagall, 23 Nova L. Rev. 899, 903
(1999).
10. E.g., id.; see also Carter H. Golembe, History Disputes Tales of Pre-1933
Securities Irregularities by Banks, 14 No. 7 BANKiNG POL'Y REP. 3, 3 (Apr. 3, 1995).
11. Cox, supra note 9, at 904.
12. Inv. Co. Instit., U.S. at 632 (1971).
13. Cox, supra note 9, at 904.
14. Id.
15. BENSTON, supra note 1, at 4-5. Sections 16, 20, 21 and 32 were codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh), 377, 378, and 78 (2003), respectively.
16. See id. at 7.
17. See id. at 8.
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a. Section 16
Relevant parts of section 16 of Glass-Steagall provides as follows:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national bank]
shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock
without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of,
customers, and in no case for its own account, and the [national
bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock: Provided
that the [national bank] may purchase for its own account investment
securities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller
of the Currency may by regulation prescribe. In no event shall the
total amount of the investment securities of any one obligor or
maker, held by the [national bank] for its own account, exceed at any
time 10 per centum of its capital stock actually paid in and
unimpaired and 10 per centum of its unimpaired surplus fund ....
The limitations and restrictions herein contained as to dealing in,
underwriting and purchasing for its own account, investment
securities shall not apply to obligations of the United States, or
general obligations of any State or of any political subdivision
thereof. 18
In reading the above section, one can observe the following four
facts. 9 The section applies only to national banks."0 However, section 5
of the Banking Act of 1933 subjects state-chartered banks that became
members of the Federal Reserve system-i.e., state member banks-to
the provisions of section 16 of Glass-Steagall.2' Second, section 16
allows a national bank to act as a security broker without restriction.22
Third, section 16 prohibits the purchasing of securities for the national
bank's own account; however, national banks may purchase and hold
18. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (2003). For the discussion in this Note, the reader
may be satisfied with the above-mentioned part of section 24(Seventh), which during
the years has grown extremely dense and long.
19. See CARL FELSENFELD, BANKING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (4th
ed., 2001).
20. Id. The United States has a dual banking system: national banks and state
banks. National banks are chartered by the Comptroller of the Currency, whereas state
banks are chartered by a state agency. For a thorough description of the dual banking
system, and its status subsequent to the enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act, see id. at 19-32.5.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1999).
22. FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 145.
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investment securities to some extent.23 The prohibition of "dealing in,
underwriting and purchasing for its own account, investment securities"
is not without exceptions.24
b. Section 20
Section 20 of Glass-Steagall provides as follows:
[N]o member bank shall be affiliated ... with any [entity] engaged
principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale ... of
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities.
2 5
The section forbids member banks from affiliating with a company
engaged principally in the above-mentioned activities.26 This formulation
invites the affiliation of member banks with companies dealing in those
activities as agents, as opposed to principals.27 The Federal Reserve
defined the term "principally" as activities contributing more than ten
percent of the affiliate's gross revenue. 2' The section, however, does not
apply to nonmember state banks which are legally free to affiliate with
securities firms.29 Two reasons for this discrimination were presented.3 °
First, in 1933 members of the Congress were uncertain as to Congress'
power to regulate nonmember state banks.3' Although section 21 of
Glass-Steagall undoubtedly does apply to nonmember banks, Congress
23. Id.
24. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999).
26. See BENSTON, supra note 1, at 8.
27. See id. at 8-9.
28. See id. at 9; see also Orders Issued under Section 4 of the Bank Holding
Company Act: Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 475 (1987) ("[T]he Board concluded
that a member bank affiliate would not be substantially engaged in underwriting or
dealing in ineligible securities if its gross revenue from that activity does not exceed a
range of between 5 to 10 percent of its total gross revenues.") [hereinafter Orders to
Citicorp].
29. See BENSTON, supra note 1, at 9 n.4; see also Statement Policy on the
Applicability of the Glass-Steagall Act to Securities Activities of Subsidiaries of
Insured Non-member Banks, FDIC News Release PR-72-82 (1982). Subsequently, the
FDIC promulgated Regulations in this regard, restricting the activities permitted to
nonmember state bank affiliates. See 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1984).
30. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 148.2.
31. See id.
2004]
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was reluctant to go further than it felt necessary.32  Second, from a
policy point of view, nonmember banks are relatively small and their
affiliates are unlikely to get deeply enough involved in Wall Street-type
activities to raise the concern that Glass-Steagall was created to
remedy.
33
c. Section 21
Section 21 of Glass-Steagall provides as follows:
[I]t shall be unlawful ... [f]or any [entity] engaged in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing ... stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to
any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to
check or to repayment upon presentation of a pass book, certificate
of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the
depositor: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not
prohibit national banks or State banks or trust companies (whether or
not members of the Federal Reserve System) or other financial
institutions or private bankers from dealing in, underwriting,
purchasing, and selling investment securities, or issuing securities, to
the extent permitted to national banking associations by the
provisions of section [24 of this title].
34
The above section is considered the "heart of the Glass-Steagall
Act., 3' By prohibiting deposit-taking institutions36 from engaging in
investment banking, and vice versa, it "fundamentally divides the
business of commercial banking (taking deposits) from investment
banking (issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing securities). 3 7
Nevertheless, deposit-taking institutions are allowed, to some extent, to
engage in securities activities.
The prohibition contained in section 21 is followed by a proviso
which, in interacting with section 16, allows deposit taking institutions
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 378.
35. FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 147.
36. This section applies to any deposit taking institution, as opposed to the
remaining Glass-Steagall sections, which focus on national banks, and due to Section 5
of the Banking Act of 1933 also on state-member banks.
37. FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 147.
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to engage in the enumerated securities activities. More accurately, the
national banks' powers are "expanded to all other deposit-taking
institutions, which otherwise would be absolutely forbidden to
underwrite and deal by section 21 .,38
d. Section 32
Section 32 of Glass-Steagall provides as follows:
No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or
unincorporated association, no partner or employee of any
partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution.., of stocks,
bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve the same time as an
officer, director, or employee of any member bank except in limited
classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System may allow such service by general regulations when
in the judgment of the said Board it would not unduly influence the
investment policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its
customers regarding investments.
39
Professor Benston has noted that the above section "prohibits a
member bank from having interlocking directorships or close officer or
employee relationships with a firm 'principally engaged' in securities
underwriting and distribution. 40  Furthermore, "[s]ection 32 applies
even if there is no common ownership or corporate affiliation between
the commercial bank and the investment company."41  The Federal
Reserve has also opined that the meaning given to the term "principally"
in section 20 is equally applicable to the term "primarily" in this
42section.
38. Id.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 78.
40. BENSTON, supra note 1, at 9.
41. Id.
42. See generally Orders Issued under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company
Act: Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1987) (explaining that given the
similarity in language of sections 20 and 32, and given the fact that they were enacted at
the same time for the same purpose and the fact that "principally" and "primarily" can
be synonymous, the Board believes that these sections should be construed together and
that the term "principally" in section 20 must, like the term "primarily" in section 32,
2004]
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This section notes once more the discrimination of the member
banks. The reasons described above are equally applicable to the
present instance.43
3. The Rationale Behind Glass-Steagall
According to Professor Benston, the original rationale for
separating commercial and investment banking, i.e., for the enactment of
Glass-Steagall, can be summarized as follows.44  First, securities
activities of banks "presented significant risk of loss to depositors and
the federal government., 41 In addition, they were "more subject to
failure with a resulting loss of public confidence in the banking
system. 46 Second, the banks were "subject to conflicts of interests and
other abuses, thereby resulting in harm to their customers., 41 Third,
"[e]ven if there were no actual abuses, securities-related activities are
contrary to the way banking ought to be conducted. 48  Fourth, the
securities industry "want[s] to bar those banks that would offer securities
and underwriting services from entering their markets., 49  Fifth,
"[s]ecurities activities are risky and should not be permitted to banks
that are protected with the federal 'safety net.' '" The fact that the banks
were federally insured and had access to discount window borrowings at
the Federal Reserve "permit[s] and even encourage[s] banks to take
greater risks than are socially optimal."5 Sixth, "banks get subsidized
federal deposit insurance which gives them access to cheap deposit
funds.,1 2 Thus, they have unfair competitive advantages over non-bank
competitors while engaging in securities activities.53  Seventh,
"commercial banks' competitive advantages would result in their
denote any substantial activity); see also text accompanying Orders to Citicorp, supra
note 28.
43. See text accompanying Orders to Citicorp, supra note 28.
44. See BENSTON, supra note 1, at 13.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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domination or takeover" of the securities firms. 4 This result would be
an "unacceptable concentration of power and less-than-competitive
performance."55  Eighth, a universal banking system "would be
detrimental to U.S. bank clients and the economy.
5 6
4. Banks Securities Activities - the Misconception
At this preliminary stage, it can be observed that, notwithstanding
Glass-Steagall, the divorce of commercial banking and investment
banking was not without certain exceptions. Put in a different way,
commercial banks were not totally prohibited from engaging in
securities activities. This part of the Note will present the legitimate
securities activities of commercial banks under Glass-Steagall. For the
purpose of this inquiry, and given the recent legislative development-
i.e., the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act-the reader may be
satisfied with partial presentation of the following legitimate activities:
5 7
investment advisory services, brokerage, underwriting and dealing and
investment.
Before presenting the above activities, a few preliminary
observations are to be made. First, Glass-Stegall's restrictions apply
only to national and state-member banks. Consequently, securities
activities of state-chartered banks are subject to the laws and regulations
of the states in which they are chartered. However, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991" changes this by
limiting state banks' activities to those allowed to national banks.5 9
Second, Glass-Steagall governs only commercial banks' domestic
securities activities. In fact, "[m]any large United States banks either
own or are closely affiliated with foreign investment banking firms and
54. Id at 14.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. For a more thorough presentation of the permissible activities, see generally
William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future - Life Without Glass-Steagall,
37 CATH. U. L. REv. 281 (1988) and Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities
of Commercial Banks: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REv. 467 (1984).
58. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
59. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 32.5 (stating the view that the enactment of
FDIC Improvement Act ended the dual banking system in the United States).
2004]
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thereby engage in such traditionally prohibited activities as underwriting
and dealing in corporate bonds and stock. 60
a. Investment Advisory Services
Isaac and Fein note that the United States Supreme Court has held
that Regulation Y of the Federal Reserve Board authorizes bank holding
companies to provide portfolio investment advice, 61 "subject to
observance of standards of care and conduct applicable to fiduciaries. 62
National banks provide similar services under their trust powers.
Isaac and Fein further note that "Regulation Y authorizes bank
holding companies to provide financial advice to state and local
governments, such as with respect to matters such as the issuance of
their securities." 64 Furthermore, by Order, the Board has permitted bank
holding companies to engage in the activity of providing advice in
connection with financing transactions for unaffiliated financial and
non-financial, institutions.61 "National banks have similar authority
under their general banking powers to provide financial advice. 66
According to Isaac and Fein, "Regulation Y also authorizes bank
holding companies to furnish 'general economic information and advice,
general economic statistical forecasting services and industry studies.'
60. Franklin R. Edwards, Banks and Securities Activities: Legal and Economic
Perspectives on the Glass-Steagall Act, THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND
SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 274 (Lawrence G. Goldberg & Lawrence J. White eds., 1979).
61. See David M. Easton, Comment: The Commercial Banking-Related Activities
of Investment Banks and Other Nonbanks, 44 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1199 (citing to 12
C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(4)(iii) (1994)).
62. Isaac & Fein, supra note 57, at 323 (Appendix) (citing 12 C.F.R. §
225.25(b)(4)(iii) (1987)).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(4)(v) (1987)).
65. See id. (citing Orders Issued under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company
Act: Signet Banking Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 59, 59 (1987) [hereinafter Orders to
Signet], approving applicant's proposal to provide "advice in connection with merger,
acquisitions/divestiture and financing transactions for nonaffiliated financial and
nonfinancial institutions"); see also Orders Issued under Section 4 of the Bank Holding
Company Act: Sovran Fin. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 744, 744 (1987).
66. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh)).
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National banks have similar authority under their general banking
powers. 67
Isaac and Fein further state that:
Regulation Y authorizes bank holding companies to provide "advice,
educational courses, and instructional materials to consumers on
individual financial management matters, including.., general
investment management." In providing such services, however, a
bank holding company may not provide advice on specific
investments or provide portfolio management. If the counseling
company also provides discount securities brokerage services, the
brokerage and counseling services must be rendered by different
personnel and in separate offices or in separate and distinctly marked
areas. National banks have similar authority under their general
banking powers.
6 8
Isaac and Fein continue:
Regulation Y authorizes bank holding companies to serve as
investment advisers as defined in § 2(a)(20) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940... to both open-end and closed-end
investment companies registered under that act, and to sponsor,
organize, and manage a closed-end company, subject to restrictions
.... 69
in the Board's interpretive ruling on investment adviser activities.
As to national banks, in 1983 the Comptroller of the Currency
authorized American National Bank of Austin, Texas, to establish a
subsidiary that will advise clients, distribute investment newsletter, and
provide certain advisory services to corporate customers and
correspondent bank trust departments. 70 The Comptroller had the view
that advisory activities do not violate Glass-Steagall for the following
reasons. First, historically, investment advice has been recognized as a
67. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(4)(iv) (1987)).
68. Id. at 324 (citation omitted).
69. Id. (citation omitted). See also Isaac & Fein, supra note 57, at 324 (citing 12
C.F.R. §§ 225.25(b)(4)(ii), 225.125 (1987)). The Supreme Court upheld this activity in
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute,
450 U.S. 46 (1981).
70. Id. (citing Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency Concerning an
Application by American National Bank of Austin, Texas, to Establish an Operating
Subsidiary to Provide Investment Advice (Sept. 2, 1983), reprinted in [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH), 99,723).
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traditional banking service.7  Second, the bank offers substantial
amount of advisory services in its trust department, consequently
established its ability to provide this service.72 Third, the wording of
Glass-Steagall section 16 is not the language that would be used to
describe investment advice.73  The Comptroller's authorization to
establish a national bank's investment advisory subsidiary was viewed
as "pav[ing] the way for a national bank to establish a full-service
brokerage subsidiary., 74 However, as Isaac and Fein note: "[n]ational
banks are subject to the more rigorous prohibitions of section 16 of the
Glass-Steagall Act and may not sponsor or organize closed-end
,,71investment companies.
Isaac and Fein add that "[n]ational banks are permitted to offer
advice and assistance on corporate mergers and acquisitions, including
planning, intermediary, research, and counseling services., 76  The
Comptroller also approved that "a national bank may act as a 'finder' in
bringing together buyers and sellers for a fee, but may not participate in
subsequent negotiations. 77  In addition, "the Board by order has
permitted bank holding companies to provide financial feasibility studies
and valuations of companies for merger and acquisition transactions and
other purposes, such as divestitures, tender offers, bankruptcy
reorganization, employee stock ownership trusts, and charitable trusts.
78
Regulation Y authorizes bank holding companies to provide
management consulting advice to nonaffiliated bank and nonbank
depository institutions; such advice may include advice on international
banking, foreign exchange transactions, and investments.79 The Board
has issued an order approving the activity of providing an on-line stock
71. See Breach Widened in Barrier to Bank-Brokerage, AM. BANKER, Sept. 9,
1983, at 3.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Fischer et al., supra note 57, at 491.
75. Isaac & Fein, supra note 57, at 324 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh)).
76. Id. at 325 (citing Letter from Assistant Director of Legal Advisory Services
Division (May 25, 1982)).
77. Id. (citing Letter from the Deputy Comptroller for the Northeastern District
(May 25, 1984)).
78. Id. (citing Orders Issued under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act:
Sec. Pac. Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 118 (1985) and Orders to Signet).
79. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.25(b)(11), 225.131 (1987)).
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quotation and financial data base service for stock exchanges, brokerage
firms, and financial institutions.8°
b. Brokerage Activities
Engaging in brokerage activities is explicitly permissible under
section 16 of Glass-Steagall."' Consequently, national and state-member
banks (by virtue of section 5 of the Banking Act of 1933) can engage in
this activity.8 2 As to nonmember state banks, Glass-Steagall does not
affect their ability to engage in brokerage activities; therefore, they may
engage in whatever activities permissible by their state charters.83 "The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued a General Counsel's
Opinion to this effect in 1983. "84
The FDIC Improvement Act does not affect the state nonmember
banks powers in this specific instance due to the following two
reasons.85 First, the fact that national banks have the power to engage in
brokerage activities meant that nonmember state banks did as well. 6
Second, section 303 of the FDIC Improvement Act specifically states
that "an insured State bank may not engage as principal in any type of
activity that is not permissible for a national bank. 87 Since brokerage is
an agency activity, as opposed to principal activity, the above Act is
inapplicable.
In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, the
Supreme Court upheld the Board's determination that brokerage
activities are permissible for bank holding companies under the Glass-
Steagall Act and that such activities are specifically included on the list
80. Id. (citing Orders Issued under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act:
Citicorp, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 497 (1986).
81. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a.
82. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a.
83. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 148.8.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 132.4-132.5.
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of permissible nonbanking activities in Regulation Y."8  Further,
brokerage activities also have been held permissible for national banks.8 9
c. Underwriting and Dealing Activities
Thus far, this Note has presented the "pure" brokerage activities
permissible to banks. These are often related to as discount brokerage
activities in which brokers charge less than the "full service" brokers
because they offer fewer services. 90 The Note now describes the "full
service" brokerage activities. The Comptroller has ruled that "national
banks may engage in a combination of 'pure' brokerage and investment
advice"-i.e., "full service" brokerage-on a regular basis.91  For the
purpose of this Note, the reader may be satisfied with the above
description without going into detail as to permissible "full service"
brokerage activity of nonbank affiliates-i.e., non-subsidiaries--of
member banks.92
Section 21 of Glass-Steagall prohibits banks from underwriting and
dealing in securities.93 This prohibition applies to all deposit taking
institutions, i.e. national, state, members, and nonmembers banks.94
However, in interacting with section 16, section 21 authorizes deposit
taking institutions to underwrite and deal in securities to the extent
permitted under section 16. 9'
As noted above, from its inception, Glass-Steagall section 16
expressly authorizes national banks, and in turn state member banks, to
underwrite and deal in securities of, inter alia, the United States, any
State and any political subdivision thereof.96 In addition, Regulation Y
authorizes bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in securities
88. See 468 U.S. 207, 211 (1984); see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15) (1987).
89. See Sec. Indus. Assoc. v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252, 257
(D.D.C. 1983) ("[T]he Glass-Steagall Act does not prohibit the ownership and
operation by national banks of subsidiaries engaged in the brokerage business"), aff'd,
758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
90. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 150.
91. Id. at 157 (citing to Comptroller's Interpretive Letter No. 622 (May 1993)).
92. For a thorough discussion of this topic, see FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 157-
58 and Isaac & Fein, supra note 57, at 326.
93. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19.
94. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.c.
95. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.c.
96. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a.
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to the extent permitted and subjects member banks to the same
limitations that would apply to.97
Due to the fact that Glass-Steagall section 21 applies only to the
banks themselves and not to banks' affiliates, and that Glass-Steagall
section 20 applies only to member banks' affiliates, affiliates of
nonmember state banks are not subject to the prohibition of underwriting
and dealing in securities and are allowed to engage in underwriting and
dealing in securities.98
Section 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibits the affiliation with any
company "engaged principally" in underwriting and dealing in
securities.99 Thus, it permits the affiliation with a company which
engages in these activities, but not "principally." The Federal Reserve
Board originally defined "principally" as generating five percent or
more of the company's gross revenue and that does not occupy more
than five percent of the total market (the "market test").'00 In Securities
Industry Association v. Federal Reserve System, the Fed's decision was
partially affirmed.' 01 The Court of Appeals rejected the five-percent
market test and accepted the five-percent gross profit test.0 2 On
December 20, 1996, the Federal Reserve Board raised the gross revenue
limitation-which at that time was ten percent-to twenty-five
percent0 3 because it found the ten percent "unduly restrictive. ' 04
d. Investment Activities
Glass-Steagall section 16 authorizes national banks and state
member banks'0 5 to purchase for their own account investment securities
under such limitations and restrictions prescribed by the Comptroller,
97. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 57, at 330 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(16)
(1987)).
98. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 164. For the purpose of this Note, it is not
necessary to go into further details as to the limitations and restrictions adopted by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
99. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.b.
100. See BENSTON, supra note 1, at 9; see also text accompanying Orders to
Citicorp, supra note 28.
101. 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
102. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 168.5-168.6.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1993).
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provided that in no event the total amount of the investment securities of
any one obligor or maker, held by the bank for its own account, exceed
at any time ten percent of its capital and surplus.'0 6 The Comptroller has
defined "investment security" as a "marketable obligation in the form of
a bond, note, or debenture which is commonly regarded as an
investment security" and which is also "not predominantly speculative
in nature."'
1 7
The Comptroller's Regulations describe five categories of
investment securities.0 8  The first category contains, inter alia,
obligations of the United States, the states, and their political
subdivisions, which may be bought without limits.'0 9 The remaining
categories may be purchased in different amounts and are subject to
different limitations.10
Isaac and Fein point out that bank holding companies may make
comparable investments."' Meanwhile, state non-member banks are
"unaffected" by Glass-Steagall section 16 and consequently may engage
in investment activities "as approved by their state chartering
authorities." ' 1 2  However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (hereinafter FDICIA) 13 has limited state
banks' activities to allowing them only those permitted to national
banks." 4  Nevertheless, this limitation is subject to a number of
exceptions that become important for state non-member bank's
investment in securities.
15
106. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (2003).
107. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 57, at 335 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1987)).
108. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 148.2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 57, at 335 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1982)).
112. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 148.3-148.4.
113. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 102 Pub.
L. No. 242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
114. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 148.6.
115. See id.
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B. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
1. Introduction
Almost as soon as Glass-Steagall was passed, calls for its repeal
began. Ironically, the most vocal proponent of its repeal was Glass, one
of the bill's authors.' 16 Only two years after the enactment of Glass-
Steagall, Glass believed the legislation was a mistake and an
overreaction. 1 7 Nevertheless, the Depression-era legislation remained
intact for over six decades. Over the years, commentators have
challenged the rationale that led to the enactment of Glass-Steagall." 8
Some even described Glass-Steagall as artificial and obsolete. 1 9
After twenty years of effort by industry lobbyists and lawmakers, 2 °
on November 12, 1999, the federal government enacted the Financial
Modernization Act,'2 ' commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 ("Gramm-Leach-Bliley"). Gramm-Leach-Bliley represents
116. See James A. Leach, Modernization of Financial Institutions, 25 IOwA J. CORP.
L. 681, at 682.
117. See Michael Schroeder, It's Alive - Why Glass-Steagall, Reviled for Decades,
Just Won 't Go Away, WALL ST. J., Apr.10, 1998, at A6.
118. See generally Ramirez, supra note 8, at 12-13 (stating that the empirical
findings over the years suggest that the Glass-Steagall Act was a misguided and
unnecessary policy--it was enacted to correct a "problem" that did not exist); see also
Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study
of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933, AM. ECON. REV. 84, 810,
829 (1994) ("[O]ur results are not consistent with the popular belief that bank affiliates
had underwritten and sold unsound and speculative securities, and published
deliberately misleading prospectuses... Allowing commercial and investment banking
to take place under one roof did not lead to widespread defrauding of investors."); see
also GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1989) (finding
that the allegation that commercial bankers abused their strategic position and pushed
low quality securities to unsuspecting investors has no empirical validity).
119. See Ron Chemow, The New Deal's Gift to Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
1999, at A26.
120. See Linda B. Tigges, Functional Regulation of Bank Insurance Activities: The
Time Has Come, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 455 (1998) (stating that over the past 20 years
ten attempts have been made to pass financial services reform legislation).
121. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113, Stat. 1338 (1999).
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an overhaul of the Depression-era banking laws. 122  It removed the
barriers that had separated banks and securities firms, thus providing
financial organizations with flexibility in structuring such affiliations
through a holding company structure or a financial subsidiary with
certain limitations, 2 3 which will be presented in following sections of
the Note.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley repealed two sections of Glass-Steagall,
which separated commercial banking from investment banking:
(1) section 20124 which forbade member banks from affiliating with a
company engaged principally in securities activities 125; and (2) section
32,126 which prohibited management interlocks.1
27
A few observations are of note here. First, Gramm-Leach-Bliley
repealed "only" two out of four sections of Glass-Steagall.
Consequently, the description of the demise of Glass-Steagall under
Gramm-Leach-Bliley is not entirely accurate. Second, the securities
powers of the banks themselves have not been changed by Gramm-
Leach-Bliley. Thus, as for the banks themselves, the separation between
commercial and investment banking still exist.
28
Commentators have generally praised the enactment of Gramm-
Leach-Bliley,1 29 whereas others argue that it is not a very important
statute given the fact that Glass-Steagall was already a dead statute and
that all that Gramm-Leach-Bliley did was to formalize the death of the
122. See Clinton Signs Legislation Overhauling Banking Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1999, at C3 (reporting that President Clinton signed into law a sweeping overhaul of
Depression-era banking laws). The measure lifted barriers in the industry and allowed
banks, securities firms and insurance companies to merge and to sell each other's
products. See id.
123. See Financial Services Modernization: Analysis of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999, at 6 (Lexis Publishing 2000) [hereinafter Financial Services
Modernization].
124. Gramm-Leach-Bliley § 101(a) repealed Glass-Steagall § 20.
125. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
126. Gramm-Leach-Bliley § 101(b) repealed Glass-Steagall § 32.
127. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
128. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 147.
129. See Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Financial Services Reform, 37 HARV. J.
LEGIs. 579 (2000); see also Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammam, Overview of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 1,1 (Apr. 2000) (describing the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act as the most important piece of federal banking legislation since the
Depression).
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latter.13° Even those who argue that Gramm-Leach-Bliley is more
psychological and symbolic' emphasize that their argument does not
lead to the conclusion that Gramm-Leach-Bliley was a bad idea.
3 2
2. Expanded Powers
Gramm-Leach-Bliley is a complex piece of legislation that modifies
much of existing federal banking law.'33 Given its limited purpose, this
Note will focus mainly on those expanded powers which are pertinent to
the analysis in this Note.
34
As noted above, the securities powers of the banks themselves
remained intact.'35 However, the securities powers of bank holding
companies, which elect to become financial holding companies, have
changed. Before moving to describe the new securities powers given to
financial holding companies, the Note will briefly present this new
status.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Section 103 adds new sections 4(k) and 4(l)
to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.136 These sections create the
new status-"financial holding company." In order to become a
financial holding company the bank holding company must file with the
Board a declaration and comply with the provisions of Bank Holding
130. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 691, 692; Randall Smith & Deborah Lohse,
Financial Firms Already Know How To Avoid Barrier Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22,
1999, at Cl; Polking & Cammarn, supra note 129, at 3 ("The significant United States
financial modernization has already taken place while the federal financial
modernization legislation remained a victim of political impasse.... In any case, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is undoubtedly significant").
131. See Smith & Lohse, supra note 130 (citing Samuel Hayes, professor emeritus
of finance at the Harvard Business School).
132. See Macey, supra note 130, at 693.
133. See Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 129, at 581.
134. For further descriptions of the remaining aspects of the act, see Financial
Services Modernization, supra note 123; see also KENNETH R. BENSON & KATALINA M.
BIANCO, FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999
(CCH LAW & EXPLANATION 1999).
135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
136. 12 U.S.C. § 1843.
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Company Act section 4(o.137 Upon gaining this new status, the financial
holding company, under new section 4(k), may engage in any activity,
or acquire the shares of any company engaged in any activity, that the
Board determines to be: financial in nature or incidental to such; or
complementary to a financial activity. 138 In addition, certain activities
under new section 4(k)(4) of the Bank Holding Company Act are
deemed to be financial in nature. These new financial activities
includes, inter alia:3 9 lending, investing or safeguarding money or
securities; providing financial or investment advice; issuing or selling
interest in pools of assets that a bank could hold; underwriting, dealing
in or making market in securities; underwriting insurance or annuities,
or acting as an insurance or annuity principal, agent or broker; merchant
banking-to some extent and subject to qualifications; 140 lending,
exchanging, transferring, investing for others or safeguarding financial
assets other than money or securities; and arranging, effecting or
facilitating financial transactions for third parties.
In addition, the Board is permitted to authorize, by regulation or
order, other activities that it deems to be financial in nature or incidental,
or complementary, to a financial activity, subject to the concurrence of
the Department of Treasury. 1
41
As a result of these expanded powers a financial holding
company142 may now own a bank, an insurance company and a
securities firm-a so-called three-way street. 143  Professor Felsenfeld
describes this as the most significant single change instituted by Gramm-
Leach-Bliley.' 44
However, with the exception of merchant banking investments,
45
Gramm-Leach-Bliley maintains the wall between banking and
137. See Financial Services Modernization, supra note 123, at 11; see also
FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 99.
138. See id. at 11 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)).
139. See BENSON & BIANCO, supra note 134, at 33.
140. For an in-depth description, see FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 105-106.2.
141. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley § 103. see also BENSON & BIANCO, supra note 134,
at 34.
142. And vice versa: a securities firm, an insurance company and other financially
related companies may now own a bank. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 100.
143. See Leach, supra note 116, at 683; see also FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 100.
144. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 99.
145. See Polking & Cammam, supra note 129, at 5.
GLASS-STEA GALL: ISRAELI DREAM
commerce. While it opens the financial services industry to intense
competition, it also forestalls the broad mixing of commerce and
banking. 146 Nevertheless, if the financial holding company was not a
bank holding company prior to November 12, 1999, Gramm-Leach-
Bliley permits the former to retain its commercial activities, subject to
certain limitations and grandfathering restrictions 147 set forth in section
103.148
Notwithstanding the above, it is up to the bank holding company to
decide whether it elects to become a financial holding company and thus
benefit from the expanded powers granted by Gramm-Leach-Bliley. If
the bank holding company retains its former status, it will be restricted
to the activities that the Board has decided as of November 11, 1999-a
day before the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley-to be closely related
to banking. 49 As Professor Felsenfeld summarized it, the pre-Gramm-
Leach-Bliley bank holding company is "frozen" as of November 11,
1999.15°
3. Securities Activities: The Repeal of Bank Exemptions
Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, banks enjoyed an exemption from
regulation as a broker-dealer under the federal securities laws.' 5 '
Gramm-Leach-Bliley section 201 amended the definition of broker
under section 3(a)(4) 5 z of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act"), to include any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.
Nevertheless, the amended definition contains certain exceptions,
allowing the banks to continue to effect transactions in certain
146. See Leach, supra note 116, at 687; see also Polking & Cammam, supra note
129, at 5.
147. Gramm-Leach-Bliley § 103 added sections 4(n) and 4(o) to the Bank Holding
Company Act, to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(n) and 1843(o), respectively.
148. See Financial Services Modernization, supra note 123, at 16; see Polking &
Cammam, supra note 129, at 6.
149. Gramm-Leach-Bliley § 102 amended Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(8),
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
150. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 100; see also Polking & Cammarn, supra
note 129, at 6.
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(4)-(5).
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(4).
2004]
548 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LA W
"identified banking products"'' 53 without being considered a broker.
This provides a way to circumvent regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") or a registration with the SEC. 54  In
addition, subject to certain limitations, a bank will not be considered a
broker while engaging in certain securities activities, even if not
included in the "identified banking products" definition. Some of these
securities activities include: third party brokerage arrangements, 5 5 trust
activities, 5 6 traditional banking transactions such as commercial paper'
5 7
and exempted securities,' employee and shareholder benefit plans, 5 9
sweep accounts, 160  affiliate transactions,' 6' private placements,' 62
safekeeping and custody services. 63
Gramm-Leach-Bliley section 202 amended the definition of dealer
under section 3(a)(5) 64 of the Exchange Act, to include any person
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for such
person's own account through a broker or otherwise. The term does not
include a person that buys and sells securities for such person's own
account, either individually or in a fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of
a regular basis. 65  Similarly, the amended definition contains certain
exceptions, under which a bank would not be considered a dealer,
consequently avoiding the risk of SEC regulation or securities law
registration. These exceptions include: permissible securities
transactions 66  (e.g. commercial paper, bankers acceptance, or
commercial bills, exempted securities); investment, trustee and fiduciary
153. This is the definition provided under section 206 of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. This
definition includes, inter alia, a deposit account, savings account, certificate of deposit,
or other deposit instrument issued by a bank; a banker's acceptance; a letter of credit or
a loan made by a bank; and debit account.
154. See Polking & Cammam, supra note 129, at 16.
155. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(i)).
156. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(ii)).
157. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(iii)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(iii)(I)).
158. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(iii)(II), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(iii)(II)).
159. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(iv)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(iv)(I)).
160. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(v), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(v)).
161. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(vi)).
162. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(vii), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(vii)).
163. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(B)(viii), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(viii)).
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(5).
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(5)(B).
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(C)(i).
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transactions 67 (for the bank, 161 or for accounts for which the bank acts as
a trustee or fiduciary); 169 and identified banking products, 70 as defined
by section 206 of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.1
71
Section 217 of Gramm-Leach-Bliley amended section
202(a)(1 l)(A) 72 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers
Act") to eliminate the bank exclusion from the definition of investment
adviser. However, if a bank performs such services or actions through a
separately identifiable department or division, 71 the department or
division, rather than the bank itself, shall be deemed to be the investment
adviser. 74  Of note here, the bank is not required to establish such a
separately identifiable department or division, however, in order to
avoid registration as well as the SEC oversight it must do so.
4. Functional Regulation and the Push-Out Effect
The above amendments to the broker-dealer definitions are part of
the new theme of Gramm-Leach-Bliley: "functional regulation". Under
the system of functional regulation, institutions are overseen by experts
in their areas. 17' Thus, securities activities, of the banks as well, are
supervised by securities experts, such as the SEC. By adopting
functional regulation, Congress intended to achieve equality in oversight
of securities activities: everyone gets the same rules, with no special
advantages towards any party, in addition to enhancing consumer
protections and safeguards no matter where the activities take place.
176
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(C)(ii).
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(C)(ii)(I).
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(C)(ii)(II).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(C)(iv).
171. See Polking & Cammarn, supra note 129.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A).
173. This definition is provided under section 202(a) of the Investment Adviser Act,
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a).
174. See id.; see also Financial Services Modernization, supra note 123, at 50.
175. See Benson et al., supra note 134, at 53 (citing Sen. Rod Grams, Chairman of
the Senate Securities Subcommittee).
176. See id. (citing Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman of the House Commerce Committee,
Cong. Rec., Nov. 4, 1999, at HI 1533).
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Even prior to the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the SEC attempted
to achieve this status, although without much success.
77
Notwithstanding the above, this concept of functional regulation is
not without any exceptions. As described above, a few exceptions were
added to the broker-dealer definitions, which enable banks to continue to
render certain securities services, without the risk of SEC regulation or
securities law registration. 7 8 In fact, Congress did not intend to regulate
traditional banking activities, even though they involve certain securities
activities. 79  Consequently, Gramm-Leach-Bliley excludes from the
SEC's new jurisdiction certain traditional banking activities, although
aspects of securities activities are involved.'80
The above revision is said to have a "push-out" effect.'8 ' Instead of
having the SEC supervise the bank itself, as well as register the bank as
a broker dealer, banks are expected to conduct their securities activities,
which are not excluded, outside the banks in distinct affiliated securities
firms. 12  Put differently, the securities activities are expected to be
"pushed out" of the banks.
II. THE ISRAELI SYSTEM
A. The Role of the Capital Market
An efficient capital market is a highly important factor in the
growth of an economy.8 3 The main role of the capital market is to
direct savings to investment. This explains the capital market's
influence on the allocation of resources in the economy. 8 4 It is common
to distinguish between the capital market and the money market. This
classification is based on the maturity of the claims. The market for
177. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 153; see also Am. Bankers Assoc. v. S.E.C.,
804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
178. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
179. See FELSENFELD, supra note 19, at 155.
180. See id.
181. See id.; see also Polking & Cammam, supra note 129, at 16.
182. See id.; see also Polking & Cammam, supra note 129, at 16.
183. See Report of the Bejsky Commission of Inquiry on Regulation of the Bank
Shares (Apr. 1986), at 53 (Hebrew, on file with author) [hereinafter Bejsky Report].
184. See id.
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short-term debt (less than one year) is called the money market and the
one for long-term is called the capital market.'85
The capital market can be divided into two categories-the primary
market and the secondary market. In the former, issuers raise capital by
selling their shares to the public. 8 6  In the latter, the outstanding
securities are being traded. 8 7  Notwithstanding the abovementioned
distinction, there is a close connection between them. The existence of
the secondary market is one of the key factors which encourage the
purchase of securities in the primary market. It provides liquidity for the
offered securities, which reduces the risk accompanying the
investment.'88 Furthermore, the price levels in the secondary market
affect the conditions of the offerings in the primary market, and in turn
affect the allocation of resources in the economy.'8 9 For securities
markets-both primary and secondary-to be able to efficiently fulfill
their economic roles, they must be influenced only by considerations of
profitability and risk.' 90 Any artificial influence on the factors of yield
and risk distorts the decisions of investors and thus distorts the
allocation of resources in the market. 19'
1. Government Intervention in the Capital Market
Since the foundation of the Israeli State, its capital market has been
subject to extensive government intervention, which is uncommon in
Western democracies. 9 a The Israeli government's continuing control of
Israel's capital market verged on outright nationalization.' 93  Most
185. See Zvi Bodie & Robert C. Merton, FINANCE 35 (Prentice Hall 2000).
186. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183, at 55.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 56.
193. Meir Heth labels the Israeli capital market until the 1985 liberalization as
"virtually nationalized." MEIR HETH, 1 BANKING IN ISRAEL 121 (1994) [hereinafter
HETH, I BANKING IN ISRAEL]. The 1985 liberalization, commonly known as the "1985
Financial Reform," had been formed to eliminate the triple-digit inflation rate, which
had escalated rapidly from 50 percent in 1978 to almost 200 percent in 1983, to 445
percent in 1994. The 1985 financial reform, coupled with additional U.S. aid, resulted
in diminishing inflation rates, economic growth, and the beginnings of a stock market
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financial assets of the public constituted credit to the government,
directly or indirectly.' 94 The banks invested the public's middle and
long-term financial assets in accordance with instructions given to them
by the government, and funneled most of these monies to the
government to finance its expenditures in return for government
bonds.' 9  Government obligations-such as government bonds and
other deposits-amounted during the 1970s to 75% of the total financial
assets in the market. 19
6
Practically, the capital market in Israel is controlled by the Ministry
of Finance. Securities Law 1968 section 39 states that every new
issuance must receive an advanced approval of the Ministry of
Finance. 97 In addition, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for setting
the investment policy for the major institutional investors, such as
mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies. The situation is
recovery. In addition, the government liberalized the banking laws in order to revive
the private sector by means of a free capital market in which competing financial
institutions would be more active. See id. See also Avi Ben- Bassat, Capital Market
Reform in Israel, 65 BANK OF ISRAEL ECON. REv. 17-30 (Jul. 1990) (Hebrew, on file
with author); Marshall Samat & Joan Dilevsky, The Development of Capital Market
Regulation in Israel, 118 Q. BANKING REv. 11-36 (Dec. 1991) (Hebrew, on file with
author).
194. See Shlomi Shuv, The Israeli Banking Market (Jan. 1998), available at
http://www.israeleconomy.orgbank.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2003) (website for the
Israeli Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies).
195. See Bank of Israel, Annual Report 1977, at 325-57 (Hebrew, on file with
author); Bank of Israel, Annual Report 1979, at 303-29 (Hebrew, on file with author).
196. In 1993, due to the Arrangement Bank Shares Law (Ad Hoc Provision), the
government's obligations amounted to more than 80% of the total financial assets in the
market.
197. See Jonas Prager, Banking Privatization in Israel, 1983-1994: A Case Study in
Political Economy (describing a study of the capital market during the 1960s), available
at http://www.israeleconomy.org/prager.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2003). The author of
that study records that the Treasury's New Issues Committee does not permit industrial
and commercial firms to issue bonds, reserving this right almost solely for the
government and financial institutions. The decisions of the latter are subject to
considerable government control. Stock issues were less controlled, but in most years
namely, to the mid-1960s, the volume of equity issues was quite insignificant. See also
Haim Ben- Shahar et al., The Capital Market in Israel, ISRAEL AND THE COMMON
MARKET 219-418 (Pierre Uri, ed., Weidenfeld & Nicolson) (on file with author). In
1987, the Treasury waived exclusivity over all bond and stock offerings, but maintained
the option to revoke its waiver.
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more acute in the bond market.' 98 The Ministry of Finance dominated
the bond market. In addition to being the largest bond issuer in the
market, it also set the conditions for the new issues made by other
issuers, such as interest rates, maturity dates, and type of indexing, thus
eliminating any possible competition.'99
The control of the capital market by the government had an
extremely negative effect on the structure of the capital market and its
efficiency. It distorted the efficient resource allocation in the capital
market, which instead was being executed by administrative orders
without any underlying economic justification.2 0 In addition, it
impeded the fundamental characteristic of an efficient capital market:
the free-willed intersection of buyers and sellers, i.e. the equilibrium
point.20'
The Share Regulation Affair, which resulted in a re-arrangement,
even further increased the government's intervention in the capital
market.20 2 De jure the government became the owner of the arranged
banks; defacto the government restricted its ownership to appointments
of the bank's senior echelon, directors and few debt breakdowns.
20 3
The harsh consequences of the government's intervention in the
capital market, which led to the adoption of the 1985 Financial
Reform, 2°4 enabled the government to diminish its intervention and enter
into the process of privatization.
2. Banks and the Capital Market
Banking is one of Israel's largest industries. In 1996, the banking
industry generated NIS 15.25 Billion ($4.69 Billion) in added-value,2 5
198. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183, at 56.
199. See Marshall Samat, Israel's Capital Market - Thoughts about Public's
Confidence Crisis, 99 Q. BANKING REv. 107 (Apr. 1987) (Hebrew, on file with author).
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See Asher Blass et al., Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: The
Case of Israel, J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 10, 79-89 (1998).
203. See id.
204. See Bodie & Merton, supra note 185.
205. In the banking industry, added value is the bank's total profits before taxes,
payroll, depreciation and amortization. The Banking System in Israel, Annual Review
1996, at 5 (Bank of Israel 1997) (Hebrew, on file with author).
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accounting for eight percent of business sector product and twenty
percent of total product in trade and services.
2 0 6
Most of today's banking institutions in Israel predate the formation
of Israel. z07 Most of them were founded by public institutions associated
with the political parties of the time.20' For example, the World Zionist
Movement, which formed the post-state Labor government, established
Bank Leumi Le-Israel in 1903 as the Anglo-Palestine Bank.20 9 Bank
Hapoalim's connection with the political establishment followed a
different path. Bank Hapoalim, established in 1921, is a creature of the
Histadrut, the national labor federation.2  Bank Hapoalim is the
financial subsidiary of the Histadrut's industrial holding company,
Hevrat Ha'Ovdim ("The Workers' Corporation"), whose raison de'tre
was to serve the agricultural cooperatives and Histadrut economic
enterprises. 21 ' A similar relationship existed for United Mizrahi Bank
and the National Religious party, a critical partner in all government
coalitions. Only the latecomer, Israel Discount Bank, founded in 1935,
is not affiliated with a political organization. It is a family-run
organization, whose growth is attributed to the "energetic activities" of
the entrepreneurial Recanati family.2 12 Nevertheless, the Recanatis are
an integral component of the Israeli establishment.213
Along the banks, a network of credit cooperatives also provided key
banking services, similar to credit unions in the United States. In a
quantitative sense, they were never significant, and by the late-1960s
206. Annual Information on Banking Corporations, at 134-35 (Bank of Israel, 1997)
(Hebrew, on file with author).
207. See infra Exhibit A (listing Israel's existing commercial banks in chronological
order of their formation).
208. See MEIR HETH, BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN ISRAEL 32 (1966) [hereinafter
HETH, BANKING INSTITUTIONS] (Hebrew, on file with author); see also MICHAEL
SHALEV, LABOR AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY IN ISRAEL 303 (Oxford Univ. 1992).
209. See id.
210. See Zvi ONN, HEVRAT OVDIM: ISRAEL'S LABOUR ECONOMY 48 (Tel Aviv: 76th
Council of the Histadrut (1964) (Hebrew, on file with author); see also MEIR HETH, 2
BANKING IN ISRAEL 170-71 (1994) (Hebrew, on file with author).
211. See id.
212. See A.P. Michaelis, 100 Years of Banking and Money in the Land of Israel, 91
Q. BANKING REV. 90 (Dec. 1984) (Hebrew, on file with author).
213. See Prager, supra note 197.
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were no more than a handful.214 Eventually, they disappeared from the
published banking records after Israel's basic banking ace' 5 was revised
in 1981.216 Exhibit A summarizes the historical development of Israeli
banks and credit cooperatives by number and size for selected years.
As depicted above, most of today's banking institutions were
founded during the British Mandate. Thus, one may ponder why they
did not emulate the narrowly focused banking model applied in
Britain,217 rather than adopting the German "universal banking" model.
The Israeli banks were engaged in broad variety of financial, and
nonfinancial, activities.2 8  In addition to the traditional banking
functions of making loans and taking deposits, they were engaged in
broker-dealer activities, underwriting, mutual and provident funds
management and investment counseling.219 Furthermore, similar to their
German counterparts, the Israeli banks directly, and through investment
funds, actively controlled nonfinancial enterprises.220
The government's intervention in the capital market blocked the
development of private financial institutions. Until the late 1970s the
relatively limited size of the capital market did not justify the
appearance of new financial institutions specializing solely in securities
221activities. Only "diversified" institutions, such as the banks, that
derived their earnings primarily from additional activities, had financial
viability. Consequently, the commercial banks dominance in the capital
214. See HETH, BANKING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 208, at 10-11 (documenting and
explaining the decline of the credit cooperatives) (Hebrew, on file with author).
215. The Banking (Licensing) Law of 1981 (replacing mandate-era Banking
Ordinance, 1936).
216. See HETH, BANKING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 208 at 10-11.
217. See Amir Geva, Banks as Linchpin in the Israeli Capital Market, 99 Q.
BANKING REV. 101 (Apr. 1987) (providing a brief summary of the Britain banking
model, stating that the Britain banks have never been legally prohibited from engaging
in the securities market; stating, nevertheless, that until "The Big Bang" reform in 1986,
they were not engaged in this market, the reason for that being custom, which amounts
to a law in Britain) (Hebrew, on file with author); see also Meir Heth, Should the Banks
Activities in the Securities Market be Restricted?, 87 Q. BANKING REV. 34 (Nov. 1983)
(Hebrew, on file with author).
218. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
219. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183, at 58.
220. See Prager, supra note 197.
221. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183, at 58.
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market was incontestable. As stated above, the banks have functioned
as brokers who buy and sell securities for customers. Only members of
the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange may buy and sell securities there, and
most of the members are commercial banks. Until the early 1990s, more
than eighty percent of stock exchange activity in Israel was conducted
by the commercial banks.223  From 1973 to 1983, the banks' shares
constituted almost sixty percent of all issues in the capital market.224
Lately, a different pattern has evolved. As of 1992, the five large
banks' part in the capital market has been diminishing gradually.225
Their share decreased from almost seventy percent in the 1992 to nearly
fifty percent in 2001 .226 In turn, the small banks and the nonbanks
exchange members increased.227 Nevertheless, the banks taken as a
whole, i.e. the large and small banks together, still dominate the capital
market.228
Due to the 1985 Financial Reform,229 the government deficit
decreased, and the inflation was restricted.23 °  Consequently, the
government's role in the financial market gradually diminished, which
led to even further dominance of the banks in the capital market. 3
222. In order to reconcile our description of the government's control over the
capital market, it is sufficient, at this preliminary stage, to say that the government
controlled the debt market, whereas the banks controlled the equity market.
223. See Shuv, supra note 194.
224. See id.
225. See generally statistics published at the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange website, at
http://www.tase.co.il.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. This important development will affect our examination of the adequacy of the
Law, and in turn our recommendations as to the necessary revisions.
229. See Bodie & Merton, supra note 185.
230. See Sylvia Piterman, Stabilization, Vulnerability and Liquidity as a Safety Net:
Some Thoughts Evoked by the Israeli Experience, BANK OF ISRAEL (2001) (describing
that following the 1985 Financial Reform the annual inflation rate stabilized at 18-20
percent and remained at that level until the early 1990s; further stating that since 1992
the monetary policy implementation brought a gradual decrease in the inflation rate to
3-4 percent and that eventually, in August 2000, the government for the first time
adopted an inflation rate target of 1-3 percent).
231. See Asher Blass & Oved Yosha, The Financial Reform in Israel and the Public
Industrial Corporations' Cash Flows, Bank of Israel Research Department (Jun. 2000)
(on file with author).
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3. Concentration in the Financial Market
Since statehood, the Israeli banking sector has become increasingly
concentrated. Exhibit 2232 illustrates the gradual decrease in the number
of banking institutions, and in turn further concentration in this sector.
This upturn in concentration occurred with the knowledge of the Bank
of Israel (Israel's central bank) and, to some extent, with its support.233
The Bank of Israel, established in 1954, has subjected the banks to
regulations and restrictions as one of its paramount strategies in pursuit
of its economic goals. 234 The seven years following its establishment
were the key period for drastic changes in the banking system.235 The
demise of the small banks and the contraction of the cooperative credit
union sector are considered to be the result of the following two
processes. First, the Bank of Israel set rather high liquidity ratios that
restricted the amount of credit the banks could extend.236 Second, the
Interest Law of 1957 established an interest rate ceiling.237 The Bank of
Israel further assisted the process of concentration by withholding
licenses for new banks, approving takeovers of small and medium banks
by the large banking groups, and allowing the banks to spread their
financial and nonfinancial reach throughout the economy.238 Coupled
with the government's intervention in the capital market, the above
status represents an entrance barrier to new competitors in the financial
market.
Aside from Ireland, Israel's banking system is the most
concentrated in the Westernized world in both financial and nonfinancial
terms.239 Competition in the banking industry takes place among a
limited number of players, which reflects the lack of competition not
only in the financial sector, but also in the nonfinancial.2 40 Despite the
232. See infra Exhibit B (depicting the process of concentration in the banking
sector).
233. See Shuv, supra note 194.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See Report of the Committee for Examination of Aspects of Bank Holdings in
Nonbanking Corporations, at 49 (Dec. 1995) (Hebrew, on file with author).
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relatively large number of banking institutions for a small country, a few
giant banking conglomerates hold a disproportionately large share of the
nation's deposits and banking assets. As of December 31, 1996, the two
largest banks in Israel held sixty-five percent of total bank assets and the
three largest held eighty-one percent.24' The following Figure illustrates
the share of total assets held by the three and five largest banking
groups242:
Proportion of Total Assets
Held by the Three and Five Largest Banking Groups
1964-1992243
100
0
t4 I! I t t
IVA54 197.5 1977 107S ISM1 IM8 IM9IO 19185 1991
The 1985 Financial Reform 244 reflects the government's new
attitude toward the banking system. As part of the reform the
government resolved to liberalize the banking laws in order to revive the
private sector and to increase the competition in the financial market.
241. See infra Exhibit C (describing the total capital and assets held by the two
largest banks and the five largest banking groups, relative to the total equity and assets
of the entire banking system).
242. See Prager, supra note 197 (emphasizing that the data may understate banking
concentration, due to the fact that banking groups include not only banking institutions
but also other affiliated institutions, stating that, for example, the share of the large five
banks in 1992 in the narrower concept of banking organizations that excludes nonblank
financial intermediaries was 86.3 as opposed to 81.6 percent share of the broader
concept).
243. Id.
244. See supra note 193.
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The results of the reform are quite in controversy. Some argue that the
results are quite substantial, leading to a slight decrease in the level of
banking system centralization, 45 whereas others are of the view that the
banks became more pivotal in the capital market due to the
government's decreased intervention in the capital market.246 However,
some believe that, despite the increased competition and the diminished
banks' role in the capital market, it is still too early to determine whether
the reform succeeded or not.247
B. The Share Regulation Affair
1. Background
4 8
As described above, the Israeli capital market has been subject to
extensive government intervention since its founding. The control of the
245. See Shuv, supra note 194.
246. See Blass & Yosha, supra note 231.
247. See Saul Bronfeld, The Decrease in the Bank's Weight in the Securities Market,
143 Q. BANKING REV. (Nov. 1999) (Hebrew, on file with author).
Securities' Trading Volumes of Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Period 5 Large Banks Other Banks Nonbanks Members
1992 72.5% 4.5% 23%
1993 71.2% 9.7% 19.1%
1994 71% 12.3% 16.7%
1995 65.5% 14.3% 20.2%
1996 62.4% 15.5% 22.1%
1997 58.5% 15.1% 26.4%
1998 52.6% 13.3% 34.1%
1999 (1-6) 55.4% 13.4% 31.2%
Id. The following conclusions can be drawn from the above table: (1) the 5 large banks
share in the securities has diminished; (2) the nonbanks' and other banks' share
increased, which might reflect the beginning of competition in the securities market;
(3) however, the last data from 1999 show some regression from the new trend;
(4) nevertheless, the banks, taken as a whole, share in the securities market is still high
in comparison to the nonbanks share. This remark will affect our recommendations in
subsequent parts of the Note.
248. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183.
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capital market by the government had an extremely negative effect on
the structure of the capital market and its efficiency. In 1977 the six
largest banks, representing virtually all commercial banks in Israel,
began to compete with the government for the public's money (the
banks issued shares and the government issued bonds).,49 In order to do
this, the banks began to manipulate the trading in their shares, which
became the most liquid securities on the capital market.25 0 The public
concluded that it could, at any time, realize its investment without
suffering losses and that, as the share price continued to rise, the banks
would continue to support the new price level.25 ' From 1977 through
1983, the banks' shares prices quadrupled in real terms. 2  During this
period, share appreciation coupled with share offering contributed to a
700 percent increase in the banks market values. 3  Even when the
Industrial Index declined in real terms by seventy percent in 1978 and
1979 and by fifty percent in the first half of 1983, the banks'
intervention successfully prevented bank shares from plummeting. 4 In
October 1983, the public began to massively sell off their bank shares.255
The banks reacted, as they had done during previous episodes of excess
supply, by purchasing their own shares.256 Consequently, the banks
were left holding shares worth $920 Million-which by Israeli standards
is an astronomical sum. 2 7 The banks did not have the necessary means
to continue to regulate the price of their shares and the government had
to intervene.25 8 On October 6, 1983 the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange was
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See Asher A. Blass & Richard R. Grossman, A Harmful Guarantee? The 1983
Israel Bank Share Crisis Revisited, Research Department Bank of Israel, at 7 (May
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Blass & Grossman, A
Harmful Guarantee?].
253. See id.
254. See id. (noting that, normally, it might be difficult to successfully sustain price
levels not in accordance with fundamental values for long periods of time; however,
also noting that, since the capital market in Israel was then, and to an extent is today,
characterized by unique features that allowed the intervention to succeed for many
years).
255. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
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shut down for eighteen days.259 During the closure, the government
devalued the Shekel by seventeen percent, assumed control of the banks,
and converted the banks' shares into government zero coupon bonds.260
Israel's internal debt grew to $7 Billion and the capital market was
paralyzed.16 ' This has come to be known as the "Share Regulation
Affair."
2. Raison d'gtre
The Bejsky Commission opened its findings with the following
conclusion. The banks chose to regulate their shares.2 62 They were not
forced to by any authority.2 63 Bank of Israel, Securities Authority,
Minister of Finance and Supervisor of Banks all learned about the Share
Regulation Affair after its initiation.26
The Bejsky Report presented two key motives for the Share
Regulation Affair, as alleged by the banks.265 First, in order to maintain
required capital ratios during the 1970s and early 1980s, in which high
inflation had prevailed reaching annual rates exceeding 200 percent, the
banks were forced to repeatedly raise equity. 266 Further, until the mid-
1980S,267 equity was generally stated at historical values, whereas other
balance sheet items were stated at current values, which, beginning in
1979, more than doubled every year.268 Consequently, without raising
additional funds by frequently issuing new shares, equity-to-asset ratios
259. See id.
260. See Asher A. Blass & Richard R. Grossman, Assessing Damages: the 1983
Israeli Bank Shares Crisis, CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter Blass &
Grossman, Assessing Damages].
261. See id.
262. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 77.
265. As noted above, the banks allegations were rejected by Bejsky Commission.
See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
266. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183.
267. See supra note 193.
268. See Asher A. Blass & Richard R. Grossman, Financial Fraud and Banking
Stability: The Israeli Bank Crisis of 1983 and Trial of 1990, 16(4) INT'L REV. OF L. &
ECON. 463 (1996) [hereinafter Blass & Grossman, Financial Fraud and Banking
Stability].
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would have fallen below regulatory requirements. 269 The Bejsky Report
noted that during those years, the banks raised from the public through
stock issues $1.35 Billion.27 0 And as described above, at 1983 the banks
were left holding shares worth $920 Million. 7' In other words, most of
the money raised from the public, under the pretext of maintaining
required capital ratios, has been used to repurchase the shares when their
prices plummeted. Second, interest groups pressured the banks to
continue to regulate their shares.272 Each bank's personnel, irrespective
of their level, held large amounts of banks' shares, some of whom even
"represented" other groups of shareholders.7 3 Thus, as long as market
prices kept above the shares' economic value, the offering of additional
shares at the prevailing market prices benefited them at the expense of
new shareholders.274 In fact, even after the 1983 Crisis, in which the
banks lost half of their value, shareholders who bought their shares prior
to 1980 gained much more than investors in nonbank shares, realizing
annualized real return of more than ten percent.75
3. Techniques Employed by the Banks
In order to support their share prices the banks employed variety of
techniques. Each bank maintained inventories of its own shares for the
stated purpose of pegging the prices of its shares, and supporting their
new levels. In fact, more than a third, and at times as much as ninety
percent, of trading in bank shares were purchases and sales for bank
inventories. 76 Eventually, by September 1983, the banks were left with
inventories of more than $1 Billion277 resulting in liquidity problems that
led to government intervention.278
269. See id.
270. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id., at 80. See also Blass & Grossman, A Harmful Guarantee?, supra note
252, at 8.
275. See id.
276. See Asher A. Blass & Richard R. Grossman, Who Needs Glass-Steagall?
Evidence from Israel's Bank Shares Crisis and the Great Depression, CONTEMP. ECON.
POL'Y (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter Blass & Grossman, Who Needs Glass-Steagall?].
277. But see discussion supra Part II.B.1. This difference is attributed to the
different sources. The data of $920 million was taken from Bejsky Report, supra note
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The banks rendered brokerage and consulting services to the
investing public. 279  The banks' brokers, who accounted for almost
ninety percent of trading in securities of all types, almost always
recommended the banks' own shares. In addition, incentives were given
to bank branches that attained certain bank share sales quotas, while
branches that did not meet expectations were financially punished.28 °
Banks extended credit to customers who purchased the banks' own
shares and curtailed the credit for those who sold them. 28' Given the fact
that credit was tight and regulated in Israel during the 1970s and 1980s,
it was difficult for customers, businesses, and households to obtain
credit at any interest rate. By tying access to credit to bank share
holdings, the banks were able to increase demand for their shares. At
times of new issues, banks provided large amounts of credit to the
purchasers of these shares.282
Mutual funds and provident funds controlled by the banks, whose
assets represented more than ninety percent of all funds' assets,
purchased bank shares when demand was low, consequently supporting
the prices. In addition, the funds made loans to parent banks, providing
additional resources to the latter to buy stock.283
Through a "parking" arrangement between Bank Leumi Le-Israel
and Discount bank, Bank Leumi Le-Israel temporarily took on some of
Discount bank inventory of Discount bank stock, and vice versa. In
doing so, each bank supported the other's stock price, whereas the
balance sheets of both banks were "window- dressed" to meet reserve
requirements.284
183, whereas the $1 billion was taken from Blass & Grossman, Who Needs Glass-
Steagall?, supra note 276.
278. See Blass & Grossman, Who Needs Glass-Steagall?, supra note 276.
279. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183, at 126.
280. See id. at 142.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 148.
283. See id.
284. See id.
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4. The Trial of 1990
Based on the Bejsky Report's publication, in which the banks were
found responsible for the 1983 Crisis, 85 the State Attorney ultimately
indicted the banks and many key bank executives (Defendants). In State
of Israel v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, Ltd.,8 6 the court held that the banks
were responsible for the 1983 Crisis and were guilty of providing
fraudulent guarantees that the share prices would continue to rise. The
banks' senior echelons were sentenced to prison and the Defendants to
pay fines.2 7
C. The Legaislative Status Prior to the Law
The crisis on the capital market showed the need to re-examine the
nature of the activities of investment advisers and portfolio managers
(the "Service Providers"). The emphasis was placed on creating an
appropriate framework for the provision of these services.
The central problem characterizing securities activities is as
follows. 288 The lack of requirements for professional and personal
qualifications in these occupations left them open to anyone so desiring,
including those not meeting minimum requirements for integrity,
reliability, education, background and professional experience. The
absence of a licensing system led, among other things, to a situation
where a Service Provider, who had been guilty of serious misconduct
285. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183, at 205.
286. Cr.C. 524/90 (Hebrew; on file with author).
287. See id. See also Blass & Grossman, Financial Fraud and Banking Stability,
supra note 268, at 461-63. For the purpose of this Note, the reader may be satisfied
with the above description. However, I will briefly present the three criminal counts on
which the Defendants were indicted, as described by Blass & Grossman. First,
Defendants impaired the banks' ability to meeting their commitments, a violation of
section 14B(a) of the Banking Order (and for the bank holding company defendant
I.D.B. section 424(1) of the Penal Code), by fraudulently guaranteeing to shareholders
that share prices would not fall even though they knew or should have known that the
guarantees might not be fulfilled. Second, Defendants knowingly gave false investment
advice, a violation of the Securities Law section 54(a)(1), the Banking Law sections 3,
10 and 11, and Penal Code section 415. Third, Defendants committed accounting
violations under section 423 of the Penal Code. See id.
288. See Ayala Prokatzia, Legislative Tendencies in the Field of Capital Market, Q.
BANKING REv. 76 (1986) (Hebrew, on file with author).
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during the course of his work, was not prevented from continuing to
provide professional services, despite the fact that integrity and loyalty
to clients constituted an essential part of them. The absence of
professional norms defining the fiduciary duty and duty of care that the
investment adviser and portfolio manager owed their clients was
egregious.
D. Recommendations of the Different Commissions
Before moving to describe the different recommendations of the
different commissions, this Note will draw some preliminary
conclusions, which will help the reader analyze and criticize the former.
By now, the banks' dominance in the Israeli capital market should
have become apparent. As described above, such dominance enabled
them to successfully regulate their shares and support their constant
price rise. Of course, when they could no longer do that because of
liquidity shortages, the government intervened and took control over the
banks. The banks' responsibility for the Crisis of 1983 has been proved
beyond all reasonable doubt.8 9
The lack of competitors--or more accurately adequate, the lack of
financially attractive and accessible competitors-in the capital market
is also apparent. The unique characteristics of the Israeli capital market
perpetuate this combined status, in which the banks dominate the capital
market and no accessible substitutes are available.29 ° In the event that
substitutes do exist, one should take into consideration the following
aspects. First, one should consider the advantages of receiving all
financial services in one place, i.e. in a financial supermarket such as the
Israeli banks at that time, and to some extent even to date. This aspect
of convenience bears significant implications. Frequently, customers
will be willing to pay an additional premium, up to a reasonable amount,
in order to benefit from the availability of one-stop-shopping.
Second, one should also consider the cost of receiving financial
services from those competitors. As noted above, receiving the
289. The Defendants were found guilty in the 1990 trial, which was a criminal case.
In order to do that, the plaintiff, in this case the State of Israel, must prove all elements
of the accusations beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra note 286 and accompanying
text. Moreover, Bejsky Commission found the banks responsible for the 1983 Crisis.
For a brief comparison of 1983 Crisis and the Great Depression, see infra Part II.E.
290. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183, at 58.
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requested financial services from the banks had few valuable
advantages. The accessibility to the financial services and products
must not be barred, in a financial sense, to the populace. The latter will
be literally barred from these financial products and services if they will
have to bear the financial consequences of receiving the services from
the private competitors, which are not subject to the same set of rules
and regulations.
Third, one should consider the cost to the banking system in the
event that one does decide to divest them from the above activities (i.e.
lay offs of respective bank personnel, reduction in bank profits), which
in turn might affect the bank's safety and soundness. Fourth, the
solution should not discriminate the banks.29' One must try, to the
extent possible, to solve the evil at all fronts, and with all players,
equally.
Finally, one must consider whether the evils that one wanted to
suppress will ever recur, even in a stronger form, when the activities will
be given by private competitors.
After the above preamble, one may be better equipped to tackle the
different recommendations. The Note now presents the different
commissions and their respective recommendations. However, the Note
will focus mainly on the conflicts of interests.
1. Bejskv Commission
In January 1985, following massive public outrage, the government
appointed a state commission of inquiry headed by the retired Supreme
Court Justice, Moshe Bejsky. gz The commission concluded, in April
1986, that banks shall not: 293 render advisory services as regard to
securities in general; 94 render, directly or indirectly, brokerage services;
trade in shares for their own account, as opposed to investing in them; or
291. This aspect is derived from the Israeli Basic Laws, which is the Israeli semi
constitution. In this regard, see Yechiel Bahat, The Basic Laws and the Legislative
Intervention in Banking, 129 Q. BANKING REv. 101 (1994) (Hebrew, on file with
author).
292. See Shuv, supra note 194.
293. The Note presents only part of the commission's recommendations pertinent to
the inquiry hereunder. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183; Shuv, supra note 194.
294. However, this recommendation was followed by a proviso that adequate
substitutes must develop before implementing it.
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manage, directly or indirectly, mutual and provident funds.29 5 The
commission also concluded that an appropriate framework should be
created for the provision of investment advice and portfolio
management. 96
2. Gabai Commission
Following the 1983 Crisis, the Ministry of Justice appointed a
commission, headed by the then-Director-General of the Ministry of
Justice, Meir Gabai, in order to propose legislative arrangements for the
capital market.297 The Gabai Commission published its report in August
1985.298 The commission's members were divided in their opinions.
The first group's recommendation was an outright and immediate
prohibition, without any prior changes in the capital market,2 99 of banks
from engaging in securities activities. The members further noted that
they were aware of the fact that immediate implementation of this
recommendation would result in a void.3°° Consequently they were of
the opinion that in the interim, for a period of five years, the banks
should be allowed to engage in securities activities, however only
indirectly, i.e. through distinct subsidiaries.30'
The second group's recommendation was as follows. Given the
unique characteristics of the Israeli financial market, outright prohibition
of banks from engaging in securities activities is neither required nor
feasible.30 2 The banks should be allowed to continue to engage in
securities activities, subject to the creation of an appropriate framework
for the provision of these services.30 3
295. See Shuv, supra note 194.
296. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
297. See Gabai Commission - The Report of the Commission To Propose
Legislative Arrangements for the Capital Market (Aug. 1985) (Hebrew, on file with
author) [hereinafter Gabai Commission].
298. See id.
299. This contrasts with the Bejsky Commission's recommendation to prohibit
banks from rendering advisory services to securities in general only if adequate
substitutes will develop. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
300. See Gabai Commission, supra note 297, at 168.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See id.
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E. Share Regulation Affair and the Great Depression
In many ways, 1983 was in Israel's economic history what 1929
was to the United States.3°4 However, the two episodes emerged from
extremely different financial backgrounds. As described above, the
Israeli financial market has unique characteristics. Furthermore, the
banks' role in the financial market, in addition to the existence of
substitutes for the banks, in both countries is extremely different as well.
Both episodes ended with widely publicized official inquiries and
spectacular criminal trials, although the trials in the United States were
not for manipulation per se, but for other offenses, such as tax evasion
and fraud.305  However, the Israeli trial ended with findings that the
banks were responsible for the 1983 Crisis and were guilty of providing
fraudulent guarantees that the share prices would continue to rise.30 6
The United State's episode ended with the passage of Glass-
Steagall which, among other things, separated commercial and
investment banking. In Israel, however, the legislative response came
only twelve years later, with the enactment of the Law. Of note here,
despite the Bejsky Commission's recommendation for the adoption of a
Glass-Steagall-style law,307 the Israeli legislature did not follow this line
of advice.308  Following the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which
ended the separation of commercial and investment banking, the
legislative status of both countries, in this regard, is not altogether
dissimilar. However, one should not forget that Gramm-Leach-Bliley
did not change the powers of the banks themselves. Thus, as to the
banks themselves, the powers of the respective banks are much different.
As described above, eventually the U.S. episode ended with the
conclusion that the accusations, as to the banks' responsibility for the
Great Depression, were a mistake and the enactment of Glass-Steagall
was an overreaction. This, in turn, led to the passage of Gramm-Leach-
Bliley.309 Although the Israeli episode is relatively new and the subject
304. See Sarnat, supra note 199, at 105; see also Blass & Grossman, Who Needs
Glass-Steagall?, supra note 276.
305. See id.
306. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
307. For Bejsky Commission's recommendations, see supra note 293 and
accompanying text.
308. For a presentation of the Law, see infra Part II.F.
309. For Glass's remarks, see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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is still reviewed by commentators and legislators, the passage of time
will not make a difference as to the banks' responsibility for the 1983
Crisis, which has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt.31 °
F. Regulation of Investment Advice and Investment Port folio
Management Law, 1995
In order to better understand the banks' securities powers as
contained in the Law, the Note will briefly present two additional
aspects, which the Law remedied.
1. Personal and Professional Qualifications
As previously stated, prior to the enactment of the Law, there was
no mandatory regulation determining who could act as investment
adviser or portfolio manager. Such a situation is unacceptable in any
well-run state. The Law provided that activity as an investment adviser
or portfolio manager would be reserved for licensees only,31 as is the
case for lawyers, doctors, and accountants. In order to receive a license
under the Law, candidates must meet a number of conditions, complete
an internship and pass written professional examinations.31 2 In this
respect, the Law adopted the British,31 3 as opposed to the American,
3 14
310. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
311. See § 2 of the Law.
312. See § 8 of the Law.
313. See Meir Heth, Supervision of Investment Advisers and Portfolio Managers in
Britain, 132 Q. BANKING REV. (1995) (Hebrew, on file with author). Supervision of
investment advisers in Britain is based on "Authorization" which in fact means
licensing. In addition to registration, an investment adviser requires a license to carry
on the profession. The Financial Services Act (1986) forbids carrying on investment
businesses without authorization, unless there is a specified exemption in the law.
Persons operating investment businesses without authorization are guilty of a criminal
act, and ,furthermore, heavy civil sanctions are imposed-the courts will not enforce
contracts signed by such persons with their clients. The definition of investment
businesses includes the sale and purchase of investments on behalf of other persons,
portfolio management, investment consulting and management of mutual funds. In
order to receive a license the applicant must present suitable qualifications for
managing an investment business. The aim of the law is to verify that persons engaged
in the investment sector possess suitable qualifications and an acceptable past. See id.
314. See id. In the United States, supervision of the investment advisory sector is
based on reasonable disclosure, a requirement for registration but not authorization or
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approach. The Law seeks to ensure that the conditions set for receiving
such a license will continue to apply in the future.315 If the licensee fails
to maintain any of the conditions, the Securities Authority may cancel or
suspend the license.316 In addition, the Law provides a number of
circumstances which entitle the Securities Authority to cancel or
suspend a license previously granted: if a person has been declared
bankrupt, lacks legal capacity,31 or faces indictment.3" 8 The Law has
achieved its aims in establishing professional and personal qualifications
for investment advisers and portfolio managers.
2. Duties of Licensees
Investment advisers and portfolio managers are subject to two main
duties: the duty of care in providing services and a duty of loyalty
toward the client. Prior to the enactment of the Law, Israeli legislation
did not contain any specific reference to the duty of care or the fiduciary
duty applicable to the above occupations. However, it was, and still is,
possible to apply general norms of law to the relationship created
between the investment adviser or the portfolio manager and his client.
Following the recommendations of the Gabai Commission, the above
duties were established in the Law.
licensing. Although registration has similarities with licensing, there are fundamental
differences between the two. Persons wishing to give investment advice must register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. They are required to fill in a
questionnaire and give full details of their occupation, qualifications, business plans, as
well as to state whether they have been prevented from engaging in any activity for
reasons which may disqualify them from acting as advisers. Based on the answers to
the questionnaire, the Securities and Exchange Commission decides whether or not to
accept the registration application; thus, in fact, registration and licensing are very close
in meaning. However, in the United States, registration is not subject to pre-determined
qualifications and, therefore, if the Securities and Exchange Commission finds that the
details submitted in the questionnaire are satisfactory, a person will be registered and
may act as an investment adviser without reference to his professional qualifications.
See id.
315. See § 10 of the Law.
316. See § 10(a) of the Law.
317. See § 10(a)(5) of the Law.
318. See § 10(c) of the Law.
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3. Securities Powers
The Bejsky Commission's recommendation to divest the banks
from their securities powers has not been accepted by the Israeli
legislature. Consequently, the securities powers of the banks
remained,319 almost as they were prior to 1983 Crisis.
3 20
From the name of the Law, it may be apparent that it deals only
with investment advice and portfolio management. With regard to
underwriting or additional securities activities, such as merchant
banking, the Law does not apply. The "Provisions of the Supervisor of
the Banks: Adequate Banking Practices', 32' allow Israeli banks to engage
in these activities only through affiliates. Thus, due to the fact that the
banks were allowed to retain their securities powers as existed prior to
1983 Crisis, the Israeli legislature decided not to deal with the affiliates'
securities powers in the Law. By doing so, the Israeli legislature
perpetuated the banks affiliates' securities powers. As noted above,
Bejsky and Gabai Commissions wanted to prohibit the banks from
engaging in these securities activities even through affiliates.
Section 9(a) of the Law states that a bank may not engage in
portfolio management.3 22 In practice, this prohibition did not affect the
banks, which even prior to the Law, and as a lesson from the 1983
Crisis, transferred this activity to affiliated companies.323 The Law does
not prohibit affiliates of a bank from engaging in the above activity.
However, the Law does not specifically permit affiliates to engage in
this activity. Of note, when the bill for the Law was presented, it did
contain a specific permission to engage in this activity. However, the
fact that the banks' affiliates are engaged in this activity without being
warned by the regulators makes this issue semantic and meaningless.
Section 9(b) of the Law states that a bank may engage in
investment advice without a need to receive a license; however, the
319. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
320. However, some bankers claim that, due to the Law, their securities activities
are frozen. The reasons for this claim, which stem from the duties and norms contained
in the Law, are beyond the scope of this Note.
321. See Provisions of the Supervisor of the Banks: Adequate Banking Practices,
Section 4(a) (Hebrew, on file with author).
322. See Regulation of Investment Advice and Investment Portfolio Management
Law (1995) (Hebrew, on file with author).
323. See supra note 321.
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banks' personnel who provide this service must obtain a license.324 In
this regard, the legislature adopted the "Chinese wall" solution, as
opposed to the Commissions' recommendations to prohibit banks from
rendering this service. The Law does not explicitly require the banks to
separate their investment advice activities from the traditional banking
activities, i.e. erecting a "Chinese wall". However, the duties and norms
contained in the Law require the banks, in order to fulfill those duties, to
separate its investment advice activities from its traditional banking
activities. Nevertheless, section 10 of the Provisions of the Supervisor
of the Banks: Adequate Banking Practices does require a bank, which
directly engages in investment advice activities, to separate these
activities from its remaining traditional banking activities.
Consequently, the fact that the Law does not require the separation is
again meaningless.
G. Examination of Beisky Commission's Recommendations
The Bejsky Commission wanted to replicate the U.S. Depression-
era-type legislation, such as Glass-Steagall. It wanted to separate the
commercial and investment banking without any exceptions. However,
as described above, even in the United States the separation was not an
absolute one. Regarding the question of whether an outright separation
will benefit the financial system and prevent the reoccurrence of
additional crisis, even the Bejsky commission could not answer.
The author is of the view that the Bejsky Commission's
recommendation is not applicable to the Israeli financial market. The
solution for the problem must not disregard the unique financial
environment in which it will be implemented. Due to the pivotal role of
the banks in the financial market, the substitutes are scarce and
inaccessible to the populace. In addition, one must not forget that by
separating commercial and investment banking, one transfers the ball to
the investment banks' field. Query as to whether that field is greener
than that of the banks. The Bejsky Commission did not examine Israeli
investment company's practices. It is not obvious that the latter will be
able to render better and safer securities services. From a financial
sense, the separation will affect the populace's ability to receive
324. Regulation of Investment Advice and Investment Portfolio Management Law
(1995) (Hebrew, on file with author).
GLASS-STEA GALL: ISRAELI DREAM
financial services. In order to receive financial services from the private
institutions the customers should have larger amounts than they need in
order to receive the same services from commercial banks. Further, the
costs of receiving these services are much higher than those charged by
commercial banks .1 5  If one wants to adopt such an old-fashioned
system, one should carefully examine the practices of the substitutes, or
one evil could be replaced with a bigger evil.
The Bejsky Commission did not examine the implications of
separating commercial and investment banks as regard to the banks
themselves. The separation might end up with significant losses to the
commercial banks, which might affect their safety and soundness and, in
turn, the financial system as a whole. The aim should be to strengthen
the financial system and to protect the customer, rather than the
punishment of the responsible banks. From a policy point of view, one
should also consider the banks' employees that might suffer from this
kind of separation.
Even those32 6 who argue that Glass-Steagall-type legislation will
prevent the reoccurrence of such a crisis will not accept the outright
prohibition of banks from engaging in securities activities, as
recommended by the Bejsky Commission. As described above, even
under Glass-Steagall, banks were allowed to engage in securities
activities to some non-negligible extent.
Ironically, the country that invented the separation has also
abandoned it, while the Israeli legislature thinks about reviving it. The
Note intentionally presented the development in the United States in this
regard in order to allow the Israeli legislature and commentators to be
more familiar with the new developments that occurred there.
Finally, one must take into consideration the constitutional aspect.
The constitutional revolution in Israel, which took place in 1994, has
some significant implications to any new legislation.32 7 First, new
legislation must not discriminate the banks. Second, section 4 of the
Basic Law : Freedom of Occupation states as follows: "There shall be no
violation of freedom of occupation except by a law befitting the values
of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no
325. For example, the advisory services are given free of charge in the commercial
banks. See Bahat, supra note 291.
326. See Blass & Grossman, Who Needs Glass-Steagall?, supra note 276.
327. See Bahat, supra note 291.
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greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express
authorization in such law., 328 Thus, in order to separate the commercial
and investment banking, the Israeli legislature must prove that it is "for a
proper purpose and to an extent no greater than is required." The author
doubts if this is the case in this instance. Due to the above Basic Law,
the Israeli legislature must adopt a solution that will cause the least
possible damage. Given the U.S. experience with Glass-Steagall, it is
almost impossible for the Israeli legislature to adopt such a pattern.
There is a wide variety of solutions besides the Glass-Steagall-type.
Presumably, the Israeli legislature was aware of this aspect, and
consequently adopted a different pattern in the Law.
H. The Adequacy of the Israeli Legislation
The various commissions emphasized certain failures, which have
been solved in the Law. First, the Gabai Commission observed the
absence of professional norms that define the fiduciary duty and duty of
care that the investment adviser and portfolio manager owed their
clients.3 29 As briefly presented above, in this regard the Law achieved
the Gabai Commission's aim. Second, it also observed the lack of
requirements for professional and personal qualifications.33 In this
regard, as well, the Law achieved the Gabai Commission's aim.
Third, Bejsky Commission observed the egregious conflicts of
interest between the Service Providers and the customers.33' In this
regard, the legislature followed the Bejsky Commission's
recommendation only to a limited extent. The legislature did not
separate the commercial and investment businesses, as the commission
proposed. However, the Law established duties and norms that should
solve the problem of conflicts of interests. The author is of the view that
this is the best solution for Israel's unique financial system. However,
only time will be able to tell whether the problem has truly been solved.
In the event that the capital market will change-and as described in
Saul Bronfeld's article, it has changed to a limited extent 32-- only then
328. See The Knesset, at http://www.knesset.gov.il (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
329. See Gabai Commission, supra note 297, at 150.
330. See id.
331. See Bejsky Report, supra note 183, at 128.
332. See Bronfeld, supra note 247.
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might one consider applying Glass-Steagall-type legislation. Then one
should reconsider the fact that in the Israeli episode, as opposed to the
American, the banks have been found guilty. By saying that one does
not mean to support the outright adoption of Glass-Steagall-type law,
however, given the banks' proven fault, a moderate Glass-Steagall-type
legislation might remedy the illness in the Israeli banking system that
led to the 1983 Crisis.
The Note now turns to examine whether the enactment of Gramm-
Leach-Bliley affects, or should affect, the Law. Given the fact that the
Israeli legislature chose not to adopt a Glass-Steagall-type law, the
enactment of the former does not have any direct significant
implications to the Law. However, some indirect implications may be
inferred from its enactment. First and foremost, it might signal to the
Israeli legislature, which considers adopting such pattern, that the old
solution did not succeed, or that there are better solutions for these kinds
of problems. Second, it might serve as the right and moderate model for
tackling these kinds of problems.
Finally, as described above, the most significant changes introduced
by Gramm-Leach-Bliley relate to the affiliates of the banks, rather than
to the banks themselves. This is not a perspective of the Law, which
specifically focuses on the banks themselves.
CONCLUSION
This Note intended to present the real picture, as opposed to the
common belief, of the securities powers of U.S. commercial banks prior,
and subsequent, to the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. From its
inception the separation was not without exceptions, and as the years
went by, the separation was blurred even further. Eventually, the
separation was considered to cause more damage than good, or as the
Note described it, replacing an evil with a bigger one.
This Note stresses that even if the tragedies bear resemblance to
some extent the solution must not disregard the specific environment in
which it will be implemented. Put differently, even if the 1983 Crisis
and the Great Depression were similar, it does not mean necessarily that
the same legislative response will prevent the reoccurrence of these evils
or remedy the defective practices. To illustrate this point, the Note
presented unique features of the financial market in Israel. The Note
concludes that a Glass-Steagall-type solution--even though it has been
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proved to be inadequate and to some extent even harmful-cannot be
replicated without significant adjustments in Israel. Not only will it not
achieve its aims-safety and soundness of the banking system and the
financial system as a whole-but it may end up with greater risks to the
banking system and in turn to the financial system as a whole.
Finally, in presenting certain aspects of the Law, the Note briefly
described the significant revisions introduced by the Law to the banking
system. The Note concludes that these revisions, coupled with the
banks' experience, should be sufficient to prevent the reoccurrence of
additional crisis.
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0
Bank Leumi
le-Israel
Bank
Hapoalim
1903
1922
Anglo-Palestine
Bank (1954)
Established toward the end
of the Ottoman era by the
World Zionist
Organization
Established by the
Histadrut (General
Federation of Labor),
affiliated with the Labor
Party
Union Bank 1922 Palestine Acquired from Bank Independent
of Israel Association Leumi le-Israel by the (Leumi
(1951) Eliyahu group in 1993 holds 17%
of shares)
Mercantile 1924 Palestine Discount
Bank of Mercantile Bank
Israel F (1953)
United 1925 Established by the Mizrahi
Mizrahi National Religious Party,
Bank merged in 1969 with
Hapoel Hamizrahi Bank,
and became United
Mizrahi Bank
Mercantile 1926 Barclay's Bank Entered into partnership Discount
Discount (1972), Barclay's with Israel Discount Bank
Bank Discount Bank in 1972, in Barclay's
(1993) Discount Bank
333. Shuv, supra note 194. This table lists only banks that are separate legal entities
and excludes banks that merged into banking groups over the years.
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EXHIBIT A
Corporations Holding Commercial Banking Licenses
as of December 31, 1996311
Leumi
Hapoalim
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I I
VV
Polska Kasa 1932 1 A Polish bank that became Independent
Opieki, S.A. I an ordinary banking
Bank corporation in 1993
American 1933 Yefet Bank Control transferred to f Hapoalim
Israel Bank (1975) [Bank Hapoalim in 1970
The Palestine
Credit Utility
Bank (1964)
Palestine
Discount Bank
(1957)
Palestine Trade
Bank (1953), Atid
Bank (1937)
The Foreign
Trade Bank
(1972)
Sold in 1964 to the
founders of Israel General
Bank; controlled by the
Investech Group of South
Africa
A financial institution until
1970; acquired by
Hapoalim in 1977
Founded by veterans of
the Irgun and the Stem
Group; the only
cooperative association
that still functions as an
independent bank in Israel
A financial institution until
1976
Independent
Discount
Independent
Hapoalim
Independent
Hapoalim
First
International
Arab Israel 1960 Leuni
BankF
Maritime 1962 A commercial bank since Independent
Bank 1978; owned by the
Arison Group
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1935
1936
1946
1947
Israel
General
Bank
Israel
Discount
Bank
Trade Bank
Bank Otzar
Hahayal
Haoved
Haleumi
Savings and
Loan Fund,
Netanya o )
Bank Yahav
Le-Ovdey
Hamedina0 )
The First 1956
International
Bank of
Israel
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Israel 1974 Hapoalim
Continental
Bank 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Bank 1977 [Previously a Obtained banking license Hapoalim I
Massad cooperative in 1977 and acquired by
association] Bank Hapoalim
Poaley 1977 [Previously a Acquired banking license First
Agudat cooperative in 1977; remained under International
Israel Bank association] control of First
International Bank
Euro-Trade 1978 Founded by the Independent
Bank Contractors' Center as a
I sectoral bank for the
construction industry
- This bank functions as a commercial bank without a banking license, by
permission of the Bank of Israel. The independently owned Global Investment
Bank began to operate in 1994 along similar lines.
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Development of the Israeli Banking System Since Statehood334
- -- -- -
5 C ~ 41.!
~
0 0
E~; -
: .~o ~C
0
o ~ .2 <
41
1., 41 0)
= U .~ C
1., C W
U) ~
1948 1 23 70 93 175 8,571 0.431 50%
1954 23 95 118 315 5,365 1.687 50%
r F
1960 26 29 55 515 j4,111 0.898(2) 67%
1965 27 7 715 3,585 1.816 81%
.....................1 8 [  . . . .. . . ..2 5 ] 1 26 ) l 1, 9 3 ' 1[ 5 . 3.. . ... . .....9 %
'1970 25 (l)  14 230) 8 ,3 ,4 58%
- F - 7 3,750 F Q.512
1975 20(') 9 19' 935 3,695 113.335 9 3%
11980 25(') 2 27 : 1,099 13,569 25.426 92%/
11985 2 26(j) 3 , 9 18 0.3 91%
11990 25(l) 260)~ 1,038 4,645 95 F 87%
1996 22 ( ) 1 23(l) 1,074 5,367 125 81%
() This figure includes banks that are separate legal entities and held by other
banks.
(2) The apparent drop in assets is because the official exchange rate climbed from
0.36 Israel Lira (Sept. 18, 1949) to 1.8 Israel Lira (Jul. 1, 1955).
334. Shuv, supra note 194. Dollar exchange rates are published by the Israeli
government (Bureau of Certified Public Accountants, 1996).
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ExHIBIT C
Israel's Large Banking Groups as of December 31, 1996
$ billions (exchange rate of December 31, 1996)331
Zl i sa..-*' - o_ -
Hapoalim (I)  46.1 37% 2.4 32%
Leumi(2)  35.7 28% 2.1 28%
Discount 3 )  19.7 16% 1.2 F 17%
ThreeLargestBanks 101.5 81% 5.7 77%
First Internationai(4) 8.6 7% 0.6 8%
_ _ _... . ........
United Mizrahi 7.1 6% 0.6 8%
Five Largest Banks 117.2 94% 6.9 93%
Independent5) 7.4 6% 0.6 7%
TOTAL 124.6 100% 7.5 100%
) This figure includes American Israel Bank, Israel Continental Bank, Bank
Yahav, Bank Massad, and Bank Otsar Hahayal.
(2) This figure includes Arab Israel Bank.
(3) As of December 31, 1996, Israel Discount Bank held a 26.4 percent equity stake
in First International Bank. This figure includes Mercantile Discount Bank and
Mercantile Bank of Israel.
(4) This figure includes Poaley Agudat Israel Bank.
(5) Union Bank of Israel, Industrial Development Bank of Israel, Israel General
Bank, Maritime Bank, Trade Bank, P.K.O. Bank, Euro-Trade Bank, Global
Investment Bank, Haoved Haleumi Savings and Loan Fund, Netanya.
335. Shuv, supra note 194.
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